ANCC meeting nr 03.2 Inspection Shetland Base 7-12/3-1941

Beskrivelse

March 1942: after the establishment of ANCC the Norwegian authorities in co-operation with SOE attempted to bring the Norwegian sailors at the base under Norwegian naval command. Lt. Commander Marstrander, and Captain F. K. M. Carver, were sent to the Shetlands to report on conditions at the base. In mid March, Marstrander recommended that the crews should be incorporated in the Royal Norwegian Navy and become the Norwegian Naval Independent Unit (NNIU). They would receive basic naval training and report to a Norwegian officer who would reside at the base and be responsible for their discipline. Lt. Commander Kleppe was appointed as the Norwegian commanding officer in early April, but this proved to be a disaster as the crews refused to accept both his disciplined approach and the proposal to incorporate the men into the Norwegian navy.
Summer 1942: eventually, after several weeks of discussions, an agreement was reached on the status of the Norwegian crews. Together they would continue to constitute NNIU and remain under the command of a Norwegian naval officer, Lt. Leif Hauge, who replaced Kleppe, and with Sub Lt. Eidsheim as the second Norwegian officer at the base. Ultimately the administration, discipline, and welfare of the unit was the responsibility of General Hansteen, the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, but at this stage the men were not incorporated in the Norwegian Navy. The Norwegian officer was also responsible to the British officer in command of the base.
September 1942: at the beginning of the 1942/1943 season the Norwegian flotilla at the Shetlands Base consisted of ten fishing boats and four Arctic whalers that had been brought over from Iceland. The operational base also moved from Lunna Voe to Scalloway.

From Ian Herrington PhD. under.

I. Report on visit to th SHETLAND BASE 7-12/3-1942.

1. Ships available and their condition.
SHETLAND BASE had a total of 25 ships. In addition a request had been made to take over the newly arrived "HELLAND".
The ships were inspected and were, with exception of approx. 10 which were reported ready for operations, in bad condition. Two were still on the beach after shipwreck, two were beached in badly damaged condition after shipwreck, several others had been aground and needed overhaul, one ship had no wheel-house and was open right down to the engine-room, where the engine was half submerged owing to insufficient pumping and supervision. All ships, except a couple that were manned at the time, were extremely dirty, and their equipment and spare geer were in bad order.
It was my impression that SHETLAND BASE has had too many ships as compared with the scarcity of the shore personnel.
Comparatively large amounts have hereby been lost, and no court of enquiry has been held, as is usually the case when ships are lost.

2. The crews.
The Norwegian crews were a depressing sight. One immediately got the impression of discouragement and lack of interest in the work. Apart from this, their partly naval, partly civilian clothing, and behaviour were such as to constitute an insult to the R. Nor. N.
The crews cannot be blamed, however, for their bad behaviour and lack of interest. They have not had the opportunity to receive basic naval training and have not had Norwegian officers to look after them, When one also considers that to them, as to most Norwegians, each of these fishing crafts represents large sums of money, they can hardly be blamed for losing interest, when they have seen ship afteer ship drift ashore and be wrecked owing to what is to their mind negligence and carelessness.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding on this point I would mention that my impression is that the present officers of the base can hardly be given the blame for this.
Of course I only visited the base for a short time under special conditions, but it seemed to me that all the officers were very sympathetic and were on good terms with the Norwegian personnel. The strong criticisms I heard from the crews were directed towards the present system rather than against any particular person.
LIEUTENANT BRAADLAND seems to have some confidence of the Norwegian personnel; I heard several requests to have him returned. As far as I can make out, BRAADLAND's field of competence has not been sufficiently clarified either in London or on Shetland, which has made his position particularly difficult. In my opinion, the Authorities must to a large extent carry the blame for the differences which have arisen.
Under such conditions the writing of reports which only tend to destroy the good spirit of co-operation between Norwegian and British officers should be avoided.

3. Conclusion.
Having carried out a comparatively thorough inspection of the ships, spoken with the Norwegian crews and discussed conditions at the base with the British officers, it is my firm conviction that the service at SHETLAND requires complete reorganization.
One will not get satisfactory working conditions and probably not volunteers for crews untill an Independent Norwegian Naval Unit is set up on SHETLAND, with a Norwegian naval officer in charge, assuming full responsibility for ships and personnel. The unit should be under the jurisdiction of the Norwegian G.O.C.-in-C., as is N.I.C.1.
As regards repairs and maintenance, etc. of the ships, the simplest arrangement would be for R. Nor. N. to take over the ships. The ships will thereby be in the same position as any other Norwegian naval craft, with the repairs and equipment of which the R.N. is bound by agreement to assist. If such an arrangement is not practicable, the present system with the i R.N as responsible for the ships must be continued. This should not, however, prevent the Norwegian Senior Officer (NOR SO.) from having the responsibility, but, if so, be responsible to the R.N. It can be stated that N.C.I.C, LERWICK have undertaken to give the Nor.S.0. very free hand in this respect.

LIEUTNANT HOWARTH R.N.V.R has for the last weeks been responsible for the care and maintenance of the ships. As far as I understood a big improvement in this respect had been obtained since he took over, but it was of course very difficult for me to arrive at any definite opinion of his capability during my short visit. But it seemed to me that he would be a very helpful man to the Nor.S.O., and I think it ought to be considered to put him in a position as representative of N.O.I.C. LERWICK as he was inclined to object to serve under the Nor.S.O.
Through en organization as indicated above all the purely naval side of the work will be directed by one responsible skilled officer, which is en essential condition for good working conditions and clarity in the matter of responsibility.

The operations are comparable with ordinary combined military and naval operations. The military C.O., who is in this case the C.O. of the combined operations, receives his orders from London, and gets in touch with the naval S.O. for the necessary naval support, both with regard to the planning and the carrying our of the operation. This is a universally recognized form of organization and the only conceivable one . Actual conditions on SHETLAND prove the correctness of this statement.
After any serious damage to ships a full enquiry should be held and a report forwarded to the committee through the Nor.N. member.

II. Suggestions for the organizstion of Nor.N.I.U.1 SHETLAND BASE

4. The unit should be called NORWEGIAN NAVAL INDEPENDENT UNIT 1 (NOR .N. I.U.1).
5. Establishment.
SHETLAND BASE establishment to be as follows:
a. Main base SCALLOWAY
b. Op. -" LUNNA
c. 12 ships
d. 6 crews
e. Base personnel

6. Re: 5a. Main base SCALLOWAY should consist of:
barracks for crews and base personell, repair shops for engines and hulls, slip, armoury workshops, store rooms, etc., Mooring buoys in the harbour. The base should be set up by S.0.E., and the Norwegian C.C, will be responsible to S.0.E.'s representative on SHETLAND for buildings, equipment, etc.
It is understood, however, that the slip should be an independent enterprise under R.N., manned by British labour. The present workshops in SCALLOWAY are not sufficiently provided with tools, etc. The Norwegian engineers should be given the opportunity to acquire the necessary.
7. Re : 5b. Op. base LUNNA should consist of:
barracks for a number of temporary crews as well as for a small number of permanent personnel, small workshops and store rooms, mooring buoys in the harbour.
The base should be set up by S.0.E. and the Norwegian C.O. will be responsible to S.O.E.'s representative on SHETLAND for buildings, equipment, etc.
8. Re: 5c. As for ships, 12 is considered amply sufficient for the suggested number of crews, as with proper supervision and supply of spares, one can count on a higher working efficiency than at present. The Establishment (see para 22) has been calculated on this assumption.
9. Re: 5d. The number of crews naturally depends on the number of tasks they will be given, but a number of 6 is considered suitanle in view of the constructions at present in progress on SHETLAND.
10. Re 5e. The base personnel should consist of maintenance crews for hull and engine, each under a quartermaster as foreman They will be responsible for all care and maintenance which can be carried out by the base.
This establishment also includes a Shore Staff with a quartermaster as orderly P.O.(at the same time writer for the C.O.), in addition cooke etc.

III., Suggestions for the org, of Nor.N.I.U.I. MAINLAND BASE.

11. On my trips north I paid a visit to BURGHEAD. In my opinion this place is suitable as a base. It is small and looked very isolated, and has a good harbour for fishing craft.

12. Following are remarks and additions to statements
given in Appendix B to report on inspection of different mainland bases by unnamed member of the committee.
a) Re: 6. It is my opinion that one of the other sheds would be better as they are in a far better condition. They are not used for storing grain, but will be emptied in the near future. In this base, as in SHETLAND BASE. we must arrange for billeting the crews ashore. This can be done privately, but is not desirable both from a securitiy and diciplinary point of view - If we take one of the better sheds, it will probably be big enough for billeting the suggested crews.
b) The base at BURGHEAD is about one hour's travel from Buckie by bus. From a security point of view this is a drawback, because BUCKIE is a base for a number of civilian NORWEGIAN fishermen. But with naval dicipline leave to this place could be prohibited.
13. Establishment.
The Mainland base should consist of:
a) Base BURGHHAD
b) 6 ships
c) 3 crews
d) Base personnel,
14. Re: 13a.
The base itself should consist of:
billeting facilities for all crew's, workshops and store rooms M'ooring buoys will not be required.
15. Re: 13b.
Remarks as in para 3.
16. Re: 13c.
Depending on number of operations required.
17. Re: 13d.
Base personnel should be organized on the seme principles as the base personnel in SHETLAND BASE.

IV. CREWS.
18. Establishments see chapter V.
19. Enlistment and training. All crews should be enlisted in the R, Nor. N. and given normal basic naval training before joining the Nor.N.I.U. Quartermasters should go through the normal courses before promotion. All crews should be given instruction end training in A.A.-shooting. The same scheme of training should also be applied to present crews.
20. WAGES. Norvegian naval personnel should be paid at normal Norwegian naval rates of pay whilst serving in the bases as they are then doing same service as other Norwegian naval personnel. Operational crews to be paid a bonus for each trip, graduated according to the length of the trip, the zones to be JÆRENS REV to BUD (approx. 62°58' N, 06°55' E). The bonus should be calculated to make the crews' total income for the season approx. that earned under the present system of £4 per week and a standard £10 bonus.

21. Establishment for each operaitional crew should be:
skipper - quartermaster engineer -"-
gunner rating
telegraphist -"-
seaman - "- '
seaman -"-
At least one of the ratings should be able to serve as 2. engineer.
It should be consideered whether practical experience warrants a combination of gunner and telegraphist, with the corresponding increase in seamen.

V. Establishments.

22. SHELAND BASE

• C.Nor.0. 1
• SCALLOWAY
• Shore staff:
• Nor.- N.O. -sec. in command. 1
• P.O. (also writer to C.O) 1
• Cook (quartermaster) 1
• Cook's mate, galley boy 3 6
• Maintenance crew hull:
• P.O. or quartermaster 1
• Quartermaster (skipper) 1
• Gunners, telegraphists, seamen 6
• Carpenter 1 9
• Maintenance crew., engines:
• P.O. or quartermaster 1
• Mechanics and engineers, rank
• according to qualifications 4 5
• Armourer 1
• Operational crews (see para 21) 36
• LUNNA
• Cook (quartermaster) 1
• Galley and cabin boys 2 3
• Total: 61

23. MAINLAND BASE

• C.Nor.0. 1
• Shore staff:
• P.O. (also writer to C.0,) 1
• Cook (quartermaster) 1
• Galleyboy 1 3
• Maintenance crew, hull:
• Quartermaster 1
• Quartermaster (Skipper) 1
• Gunner. telegraphist 2
• Carpenter 1 5
• Maintenance crew, engines:
• Quartermaster 1
• Mechanic, engineer 3 3
• Armourer (if no British) 1
• Operational crews 18
• Total: 31

24. Including a reserve the total number of Nor.N.I.U.1 should be:

• SHETLAND BASE 61 MAINLAND 31
• RESERVE 24
• Total: 116

London, 19 th March 1942.
E. MARSTRANDER

HS2-138 All ANCC meetings 1941-1945.

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