COHQ Operation PULLOVER
Beskrivelse
SOE OPERATION PULLOVER.
"It opposed Operation Pullover, a plan to destroy the Nordals Viaduct near Narvik in an attempt to interdict the transportation of Swedish iron ore. It argued that the loss of supplies to Germany would be relatively small, as it involved a landing in Norway it would undermine its efforts in the area, and because Special Duty aircraft would be used other SOE missions could be delayed. The operation was, however, eventually cancelled due to „lack of suitable weather"
"Resulting from an idea of General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, during 1939, the plan was based on the para-dropping of a party of ski-capable British troops to cut the railway line at the Nordals viaduct, a notably vulnerable point. The unit selected for the task was
No. 2 Troop (28 officers and men) of No. 14 (Arctic) Commando under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. A. M. Wedderburn, who was against the idea as he believed that the entire troop would be lost, but Wedderburn’s objection was overruled at a level higher up the command chain.
The party was to have been be parachuted into northern Norway by adapted Handley Page Halifax heavy bombers, but the undertaking had eventually to be cancelled for lack of the right weather conditions during a suitable period of the moon."
CODENAMES: Operation Pulllover
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18th February, 1943. 7352/130/17
To: C.D. From: AD/S.
Copies to: D/CD(O), AD/P & D/PLANS.
I have had a talk to Oliver Lawrence about the C.C.0.'s Narvik project in the light of Mitcheson's interim reply to my message about Swedish iron ore exports (telegram No.5221 from Stockholm of 14th February).
The intelligence contained in the telegram agrees with M.E.W.'s own information. The reduced quantity of ore which will be available for Germany in 1943 could be shipped from Lulea and the reason why the Germans are taking ore from Narvik is because of the acute shortage of shipping in the Baltic and the increased tendency of the Swedes (who carried two-thirds of the Lulea ore in 1942) to withdraw their ships. This makes the Germans fear that unless they
get a steady flow of ore from Narvik this winter they Will not be able to transport enough from Lulea to give them their minimum requirements. To this extent it is important for the Germans to keep up the Narvik shipments.
I then pointed out to:.Oliver Lawrence that granting him his assumptions the projected operation, even in the unlikely event of its being entirely successful, would really come too late. I do not know what the timing is bat if the attack were made as early as the 1st March the Germans would only lose 300,000 tons of Narvik ore, on the assumption that the export rate of 100,000 tons
per month is maintained. We must perhaps ignore the possibility of an early thaw in the Baltic allowing Lulea to reopen at the beginning of instead of at the
end of May (which would reduce the loss of Narvik ore caused by the project to 200,000 tons) because the Swedish policy is to keep Lulea closed as long as possible this winter. They closed Lulea before the end of November although it did not freeze up until the middle of December.
On the basis of the facts I have given it seems to me there is a strong case for asking the Chiefs of Staff to consider whether the Narvik operation is worth
while. Oliver Lawrence says M.E.W. can really do nothing because they have not been shown the whole picture, They have merely been asked whether a loss of 100,000 tons of Swedish ore per month, would hurt Germany, to which they were bound to answer"yes“.
Further, he does not consider that the matter is one for the J.I.C. His strong advice is that we ourselves should approach the J.P.S. and try to get them to
recommend that the project for the raid should be reconsidered.
If this suggestion is approved you will doubtless instruct D/PLANS to take the matter up. If I can supply him with any further information I shall of course be only too pleased to do so.
Col H.N. Sporborg (Sign)
HS2-218-p43
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Erik Endrerud v fra NORIC(1) var plukket ut som W/T på oppdraget og gjennomgikk i Des 1942 til Mars 1943 trening sammen med No. 14th Commando på STS.26 området.
Også minst 9 personer til er lagt inn på Operasjonen, men det kan og være flere. Jeg mangler DEFE 2/522 som omhandler planleggingen av operasjonen.
Oppdraget ble deretter kansellert og aldri gjennomført.
Til Sted
| Tittel | Lenke |
|---|---|
| Narvik | Se mer |
Deltakere
| Navn | Lenke |
|---|---|
| Harry Sporborg Colonel | Se mer |
| Lieutenant Colonel E. A. M. Wedderburn | Se mer |
| Eric Finn Bjerregaard Endrerud Sersjant | Se mer |
| Paal Wergeland Sgt | Se mer |
| Arthur Henry Pevik Fenrik | Se mer |
| Hugh Percy Armstrong Sersjant | Se mer |
| Johan Lynghaug ✝ | Se mer |
| William Johannesen Sgt | Se mer |
| Inge Fosseide Fenr | Se mer |
| Julius Opåsen Fenr. | Se mer |
| Erik Johannes Olsen | Se mer |
| Ivar Hauge Lt | Se mer |
Galleri
Nyttige lenker
| Tittel | Lenke |
|---|---|
| Nordahlsbrua ved Narvik | Se mer |


