ANCC meeting nr 32

Beskrivelse

AGENDA
for the Tnirty-second Meeting of the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee to be held on Thursday, 17th August, 1944, at 4 p.m. at 88, Chiltern Court.
1. Points arising out of the Minutes of the Thirty-first Meeting.
2. Conditions in Norway and Future Policy.
3. Any other business.
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MINUTES OF THE THIRTY-SECOND MEETING OF THE ANGLO-NORWEGIAN COLLABORATION COMMITTEE HELD ON THURSDAY, 17th August, 1944.

At the commencement of the Meeting AD/E extended a welcome to Ole Lange Eng. (Jens Chr Hauge - se under).
1. Points arising out of the Minutes of the Thirty-first Meeting:
(a) Labour Mobilisation
In response to a request from SU, "0.L." explained the present situation in Norway, and stated that a far less number of people was in hiding than was commonly supposed.
He gave as the maximum number 3,000 only. The others had now returned to their own neighbourhoods. The main problem facing the Home Front leadership at the moment was the fact that further attempts might be made by the Germans to mobilise Norwegian youth. Plans had been made to convey
a great number thus threatened to Sweden, but this scheme had not been very favourabiliy réteived. He agreed that the approach of winter would increase the difficulties, and that the problem would become mire acute.

(b) Commander Horve reported on his recent trip to Shetland, and stated that the situatiion there was in every way satisfactory.
2. Conditions in Norway and Future Policy.
(i) AD/E, reviewing the paper "Co-ordination of Resistance Planning and Activities with Projected Military Operations", stated that it should be realised that it was extremely unlikely that any Allied military operation would take place against Norway. For the sake of simplicity he suggested that there were two alternative tasks facing the resistance movement in Norway:
(a) Offensive (b) Protective.
(ii) With regard to German intention, "0.L." stated that the difficulty of foreseeing this from inside the country was very great. AD/E gave it as his opinion that the Germans would try and remain in Norway as long as possible, and that when the time came it would be a case of either unconditional surrender or rout.

He summed up the opinion of the Meeting by saying that a situation of extreme confusion and chaos was more likely to arise owing to the collapse of central authority either in Norway or in Germany, which fact would render the enforcement of armistice conditions extremely difficult. He asked what the Home Front's action would be were one or other of these eventualities to come about, and added that he did not think SHAEF would be in a position at the moment to sive a directive with regard to this. "O.L." stated that the resistance organisations had no other wish than to get rid of the Germans as quickly as possible, but were prepared either to speed the departing foe or do their utmost to prevent untimely withdrawal as directed by SHAEF.

(iii) DS pointed out that owing to the time-lag in the arrival of any Allied Force in the case of unconditional surrender, the onus for disarming the Wehrmacht and keeping law and order would fall on the Home Front authorities. Our immediate support could only be by means of W/T signals and broadcasts for the purpose of establishing and emphasising the authority of the Home Front.

(iv) AD/E instanced the experience gained in France and North Africa, where the continual harassing of withdrawing Germans had been most effective. He recommended that should similar circumstances arise in Norway intelligent guerrilla warfare tactics would be the most suitadle means to employ.

in order to try and prevent the enemy carrying out a scorched earth policy. "O.L."stated that the resistance groups were prepared to do their best to counter the enemy's scorching methods.

(v) It was agreed that a directive with regard to the preservation of installations should be obtained from SHAEF, to whom a draft should be submitted with an appendix containing a list of priorities for the protection of both industrial and
communications targets.
(vi) SU advocated the opening up of a gateway into Norway through the capture by air-borne troops of SOLA aerodrome. DS added that a pincer movement from Sweden by the Police troops might be a possibility. He drew attention to the fact that the probability was that N.I.C.(1) personnel would all be dispatched to Norway within the next two or three months.

For a spearhead attack of this nature the available troops were the Norwegian Parachute Company (160 strong), the special Mountain Company (200 strong), and the Norwegian Commandos (80 strong).

(vii) It was noted with great approval that a leading Norwegian officer had been nominated to act as immediate Commander in the field, and to take present charge of the Police groups in Sweden.

(viii) Reverting to the protection of industrial plant, "O.L." gave his opinion that only a few of the most valuable plants should be dealt with, and that such activity should be restricted in order to achieve the maximum success. He further stated that arrangements and preparations were veins made, and that
personnel were available. With regard to personnel, he recommended that if possible they should be put into uniforn, be organised more. cefinitely on military lines, and made responsive to discipline. In this connection he stated that there was a definite shortage of suitable leaders, and there was urgent need for reinforcements from outside, especially of military experts. SU stated that arrangements. for securing such military experts in this country were under way. "O.L." asked for some senior officers to be brought to Norvay, and
kept in hiding for the time being. He was confident that this was practicadle, and could be done successfully.

(ix) SU suggested that the intelligence side of the Home Front should be Improved, and recommended that a standard questionnaire containing the most vital points of intelligence required by the Allies should be sent out to the field.

(x) The question of preserving and capturing Gestapo Gocuments and records was raised. "O.L." stated that the resistance organisations were familtar with the location of such documents and records, and that possibilities existed for effectively dealings with these when the time came.

(xi) SU asked what the possibilities were of obtaining further W/T sets for Norway. The Committee was informed that the situation at the moment was far from satisfactory, and that production had been handicapped by the flying bomb attacks.

DS explained that home-made sets had been manufactured in Norway, but that these sets lack certain vital parts. A supply had been promised from this country, but had not yet materialised, and he asked AD/E for his assistance in speeding up delivery as soon as possible. DS/US offered to find out the position with regard to the supply of suitable W/T sets from the U.S.

(xii) DS thanked "0.L." on behalf of the Committee for all the good work he had done in the field in connection with N.I.C.(1) personnel. In reply "0.L." expressed the thanks of the organisations in Norway, and his and their appreciation for the part these well-trained men had played in instilling
enthusiasm, courase and purpose into elements of the Home Front with which they had come into contact.

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Distribution:
CD (for information) V/CD
AD/E DS
DS/US SN
Mr.Boye (4 copies) File.

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"Den faktor som bidro mest til full forståelse mellom Milorg og London, var at ledelsen i London i august 1944 fikk besøk av sjefen for Milorg. Wilson har fortalt om dette: «Jeg hadde ingen anelse om hvem han virkelig var, og han fløy over fra Stockholm under navnet "Ole Lange" Mesteparten av hans tid
ble opptatt av drøftelser med den norske regjering, og da han kom til Kingston House, ble han tatt imot av Thore Boye som øyeblikkelig kjente ham igjen - de hadde gått på skolen sammen!
Han arbeidet også noen dager sammen med den norske seksjonen på Oxford Square. Øen viste ham inn til meg og sa: «Her er Ole Lange som du har vært så ivrig etter å treffe. Jeg lar dere bli alene, så dere kan snakke fortrolig sammen.» Jeg ønsket ham velkommen og sa: «Vær så god, sitt ned, Mr.
Lange.» Han ble imidlertid stående og svarte: «Jeg kan ikke sette meg før jeg har fortalt Dem hvem jeg er. Mellom Dem og meg kan det ikke være noe hemmelig. Jeg heter Jens Christian Hauge.» Vi kom til full enighet på alle punkter, og takket være det ble motstandsbevegelsen siden ledet av Oslo og London i full overensstemmelse."

Les mere i boken "Krigsår : med Kompani Linge i trening og kamp" under.

HS2-138 p 37++

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